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ABSTRACT This article disputes three positions entrenched in the essentialist interpretation of R.H. 
Tawney’s political thought. First, it contests the notion that Tawney’s work is characterised by an 
overwhelming consistency. Whilst the Tawney canon displays a thematic persistence, a chronological 
analysis demonstrates that he significantly altered his core political concepts. Second, the article  
asserts that the prevailing consensus among commentators that Tawney’s politics is largely a 
derivative of his religion is one-dimensional, ignoring the extent to which Tawney’s politics departed 
from its Christian foundations. Both of these mistaken notions – overwhelming consistency and 
derivation from religion – are exemplified in the third erroneous position adopted by commentators – 
the elevation of Tawney’s private diaries (known as the Commonplace Book) to a key role in setting the 
seal on his subsequent political thought. By exposing these fallacies, the article seeks a more authentic 
interpretation of Tawney’s political thought. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The three main commentators on Tawney’s political thought - Ross Terrill 1, WH Greenleaf 2 and 
Anthony Wright 3 - are united in their assertion of Tawney’s consistency. Terrill claims that Tawney 
was “just as radical (in the British sense) in 1960 at the age of eighty as he had been forty years before, 
and who could republish his analyses of capitalism and socialism despite all that had happened over 
those four decades” 4 . Greenleaf states that Tawney’s published works “presuppose, and may be seen 
to exemplify in particular and important aspects, the conceptions of morality and divine justice in 
which he had come to believe and which are, often so starkly, reflected in the pages of the diary” 5 . In 
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his R.H. Tawney, Anthony Wright argues that Tawney “had said what he had to say in the 1920s, in a 
trio of books (The Acquisitive Society, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism and Equality) which made 
his name, and went on saying very much the same things thereafter…the overall impression is of a 
massive unity, consistency and coherence” 6. 
 
This shared perception of the consistency of Tawney’s political thought feeds directly into a second 
assertion – that Tawney’s politics largely derives from his Christian religion 7. Terrill states that 
Tawney “located” his political thought in Christianity 8 ; Greenleaf argues that Tawney’s “ideas were 
founded on a sincere and fervent acceptance of the essential truth of Christian doctrine” 9 ; and Wright 
affirms the “overwhelming centrality” of Christianity in Tawney’s works 10.  
 
Both these assertions are exemplified in a third assumption – the major status accorded by the 
commentators to Tawney’s early diaries (the Commonplace Book – written in 1912-1914), as an 
expression of his Christian philosophy. Indeed, the commentators excavate the diaries to produce an 
‘integral’ Tawney, with the religious musings of the Commonplace Book featured as the foundation of 
all his subsequent thought. For example, Terrill aligns the diaries with the published works in framing 
Tawney’s political concepts; Greenleaf stresses that the diaries corroborate what is apparent from the 
published works - the profound influence of Christianity; and Wright argues that the Commonplace 
Book settles the debate on whether Tawney was a secular or Christian moralist, decisively in favour of 
the latter.  
 
This paper seeks to challenge these three assertions, by demonstrating that Tawney’s political thought 
is not consistent but changes significantly over the course of his long writing career; that one important 
change is that he dilutes his early attachment to Christianity as the foundation stone of his political 
thought; and that the diaries (the Commonplace Book) are not the key to an understanding of Tawney’s 
political thought.   
 
In section 2, the essentialist approach to Tawney is presented, showing that the interpretations offered 
by Terrill, Greenleaf and Wright are marked by the prioritisation of certain aspects of the Tawney 
canon to produce a contrived cohesion that neglects the developmental nature of Tawney’s thought. 
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This results in an almost static depiction of the relationship between his religion and his politics in 
which Christianity, derived from the diaries, dominates. In section 3, Quentin Skinner’s criticism of the 
theoretical weakness of the essentialist approach in cultivating the mythology of coherence is 
rehearsed. In section 4, evidence from Tawney’s writings is presented to refute each of the three 
mistaken claims made by essentialist commentators. To refute the first and second claims, a 
chronological approach is used to track the evolution of Tawney’s political thought, concentrating on 
the key concepts of equal worth and the political realm to demonstrate that his ideas underwent 
considerable change from a Christian exclusivity, which held that core values were conceptually 
dependent on a belief in the existence of God, to a predominantly secular position that core values were 
based largely on rational analysis. To refute the third claim, critical attention is focused on the 
Commonplace Book, to show that the private nature of the diaries that Tawney kept between 1912-14, 
far from revealing the real Tawney unencumbered by an audience, undermines their interpretive value. 
Section 5 is a conclusion in which the findings of the paper are summarised. 
 
THE ESSENTIALIST INTERPRETATION 
 
Ross Terrill 
 
Terrill sets himself the task of understanding the role of Christianity in Tawney’s politics to assess the 
capacity of Tawney’s vision to inform an increasingly secular society 11. Terrill declares his intention to 
make a “systematic construction” out of Tawney’s writings, with an approach that “assumes a certain 
constant core”, as a means of “demystifying” Tawney’s thought 12. Recognising the potential pitfall of 
this approach - that any sense of change with be lost - Terrill claims that this risk is mitigated by the 
biographical chapters in the first part of his book, which “attend to the development of Tawney’s 
thought through the various stages of his life” 13. However, Terrill fails to establish linkage between 
these two sections of his book. The biographical narrative in the first part of the book demonstrates 
how Tawney’s attitude towards Christianity and the Church altered over time, to the point that, 
eventually, “theology slipped to the unexamined corners of his mind” 14. But this shift is not carried 
over into Tawney’s political thought in the second part of the book, where Terrill’s analysis depicts 
Tawney’s ideas as a static, systematic structure, thus ignoring any element of development.  
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On the other hand, Terrill does recognise that Tawney’s conception of man is not derived purely from 
biblical authority, but also from his own life-experiences – including the classrooms of the Worker’s 
Education Association, and the trenches of the Great War 15. This concern not to exaggerate the role of 
Christianity in Tawney’s political thought is reflected in the analytical chapters in Terrill’s discussions 
of concepts such as property, social function and citizenship, which are seen as the product of a variety 
of influences. Nevertheless, Terrill declares that religion gave that “vital margin of meaning to a 
number of Tawney’s ideas”, and he argues that without the widespread acceptance of Christian 
assumptions, some of Tawney’s key arguments would be severely impaired. For example, the concept 
of the equal worth of all human beings would be left unsupported; the advocacy of the redistribution of 
wealth from the rich to the poor would be no longer compelling; the need for the diffusion of power 
would be brought under question; the case for greater social solidarity would diminish; and the reason 
for refraining from exploiting nature to exhaustion would vanish 16. Terrill also includes the diaries as 
part of the corpus of Tawney’s work that establishes its Christian foundation, although his emphasis on 
them is less pronounced than in the other commentaries. 
 
So Terrill’s interpretation of Tawney’s political thought is that it is essentially unchanging and static, 
with an enduring Christian influence, persisting from the diaries onwards.  
 
W.H. Greenleaf 
 
Greenleaf asserts that Tawney’s political theory is coherent, claiming that in 1952, he “was still of 
opinion that the basic impulse behind British Socialism” was ‘“unashamedly ethical’…This…was 
broadly the Christian- and morality-based approach to political and social change that Tawney was 
working out in the years immediately before the Great War” 17. The intellectual context in which 
Greenleaf places Tawney is pre-eminently Christian, connecting him with such figures as T.H. Green, 
Bishop Gore and Canon S.A. Barnett 18, who reinforced Tawney’s commitment to a transcendental 
(Christian) notion of natural law which provides a standard of truth and righteousness to judge both 
individuals and social arrangements 19. Although Greenleaf acknowledges that Tawney’s involvement 
in the First World War stimulated an explicit embrace of the Labour Party and the acceptance of 
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practical reforms, he is adamant that the fundamental themes of his socialism were laid down in his 
Christian beliefs. For example, Greenleaf characterises the central message of The Acquisitive Society 
as the need to alter social arrangements in line with “principles of an ethical, indeed Christian, kind” 20. 
The notion that economic issues cannot be confined to the amoral domain of the market, and must be 
brought under the ambit of Christian moral standards, is a particular feature of The Acquisitive Society, 
leading Greenleaf to state that “It is most surprising, therefore, that in the exposition or appraisal of 
Tawney’s work, due attention is not always given to the continuous formative influence of his 
Christian moralism” 21.  
 
Although he accords a secondary role to Tawney’s Commonplace Book, in that it clarifies and 
reinforces the understanding that can already be gleaned from the works Tawney sanctioned for 
publication, Greenleaf depicts the Commonplace Book as saturated with religiosity, arguing that 
Tawney’s belief in God is revealed there in its full intensity as a profound inner feeling of an 
overwhelming presence. For example, Greenleaf, utilising direct quotations from the Commonplace 
Book, demonstrates how Tawney saw categories such as equality and morality as dependent on a belief 
in God, and that to assert the “infinite importance” and equal valuation of all human beings requires the 
common fatherhood of God 22. Furthermore, Tawney’s vivid analogy in the diaries describing human 
nature as “a house built on piles driven into black slime and always slipping down”, demonstrates his 
embrace of the Christian concept of original sin 23, and Greenleaf argues that Tawney’s sense of flawed 
human nature was a persistent feature of his political thought. According to Greenleaf, the diaries are 
clear that societal problems can only be overcome by a religious-based morality that exposes individual 
moral deficiencies and stimulates ethical renewal, and Greenleaf presents this as a defining element of 
Tawney’s socialism that differentiates his political thought from Marxism and Fabianism.  
 
According to Greenleaf, therefore, this religious dimension is not merely an attribute of Tawney’s early 
thought, but continued to be a “formative” influence throughout his intellectual career: his output is 
saturated with Christian moralism. So Greenleaf’s interpretation sees Tawney’s political thought as 
consistently pervaded by the Christian doctrine which originated in the diaries. 
 
Anthony Wright 
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Wright’s book on Tawney 24 also offers an essentialist interpretation of Tawney’s political thought, 
portraying the Commonplace Book as the guide through which we must understand Tawney’s later 
work. Indeed, Wright imbues the diaries with major interpretative significance. Responding to Beatrice 
Webb’s incomprehension at Tawney’s commitment to Christianity, Wright states:  
 
If Beatrice, and others, had seen Tawney’s own diary, then the mystery would have been 
resolved…because it forms the unstated inner core of Tawney’s published work. It is not just that he 
believes in the existence of God (as a ‘fact of experience’), nor in Christianity as the personification of 
God, revealing his nature, but that he holds these beliefs to be the indispensable basis for a true morality 
25
.   
 
According to Wright, by demonstrating Tawney’s profound commitment to Christian ethics, the 
Commonplace Book performs the crystallising role of making explicit the religious assumptions that 
governed the concepts used thereafter in his political works. Indeed, Wright casts the diaries as the 
theoretical foundations of Tawney’s political doctrine, arguing that these musings before the First 
World War form the lens through which to interpret Tawney’s subsequent ideas. Although Wright 
acknowledges that Tawney chose to express his case for socialism in predominantly secular terms, he 
argues that he did so for purely tactical reasons. While Tawney “held, privately, that it was necessary to 
believe in God in order to believe in socialism…this did not prevent him from constructing a public 
case for socialism in which God was conspicuous by his absence (except as an appendix for believers)” 
26
. The Commonplace Book is the work of a man operating outside the public arena, content in his 
privacy to display his conscience and the fundamental basis of his beliefs. By contrast, the published 
works are those of an eminently practical man concerned to assist the foundation of a new social order, 
recognising in an increasingly secular society that the act of persuasion cannot be accomplished by 
mere faith. The task for Tawney, the prescriptive social theorist, is to “persuade people who do not 
naturally share his own fundamental grounds, those of Christian morality, for rejecting the existing 
social order” 27.  
 
So for Anthony Wright, the diaries provide the key to Tawney’s political thought, showing the basis of 
his consistent commitment to a Christian foundation of society.  
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THE THEORETICAL WEAKNESS OF THE ESSENTIALIST INTERPRETATION 
 
The essentialist interpretation rests on shaky theoretical foundations. As Quentin Skinner 28 has argued, 
one fallacy of essentialist interpretations is to assume that a political theorist’s work must be coherent. 
“It may be…that a given classic writer is not altogether consistent…it will become dangerously easy 
for the historian to conceive it as his task to…find in…these texts the coherence which they may 
appear to lack…The inevitable result…will be a form of writing which might be labelled the 
mythology of coherence” 29. Skinner explains that in their urge to find consistency, such commentators 
may ignore the intentions of the theorist himself, deeming it “quite proper, in the interests of extracting 
a message of higher coherence from an author’s work, to discount the statements of intention which the 
author may have made about what he was doing” 30.  
 
We argue that the essentialist interpretations of Tawney manifest the mythology of coherence in their 
assertion of consistency – ie their assumption that there is a consistent core of thinking which underlies 
Tawney’s political thought. As we shall see in section 4, this assumption (the commentators’ first 
fallacy) is contradicted by abundant evidence that Tawney changed his views on important political 
concepts and issues. The commentators’ second fallacy - that the constant core of Tawney’s political 
thought is its Christian foundation - is undermined by the fact that a striking feature of the changes that 
took place in Tawney’s political thought is the gradual secularization of his concepts. In section 4, we 
trace this process of secularisation in Tawney’s treatment of the concepts of equality and politics. The 
commentators’ third fallacy - which consists in finding in the diaries the key to this consistency – is 
shown in section 4 to fly in the face of Tawney’s own intentions.      
 
REFUTATION OF THE THREE FALLACIES 
 
Refutation of the first and second fallacies 
 
In refuting the first fallacy (that there is an inner core of consistency in Tawney’ political thought) and 
the second fallacy (that the domination of Christianity constitutes this inner core), we use a 
 8
chronological approach to analyse the evolution of two of his most important political concepts – equal 
worth and politics. First, Tawney’s notion of equal worth will be examined to demonstrate that his later 
works departed from the Christian confines of his earlier work. Second, the development of Tawney’s 
attitude to political ideas and institutions will be tracked to show the gradual displacement of 
Christianity and the Church by socialism and the Labour Party, as the main architects of the Good 
Society. 
 
Equal worth 
Wright considers ‘equal worth’ to be Tawney’s central concept, as it resonates throughout his political 
thought:  
 
there is every reason to regard it as primary. As the evidence provided by his Commonplace Book clearly 
revealed, this was the inner core of his whole structure of personal and social morality, the rock of 
Christian principle upon which everything else was based. In this sense, it was a rock of faith not a 
philosophical argument. It was the expression of religious-based traditions of thought about human 
beings and their worth…Since all men were the children of God, each was infinitely precious, an end not 
a means, rich in the possibilities for self development, brothers and sisters in a shared humanity and a 
common civilisation. 31  
 
As Wright points out, Tawney’s concept of equal worth is embedded in a Christian ethical framework. 
However, Wright implies that this is the concept of equal worth to which Tawney adheres throughout 
his life, whereas the truth is that this restrictive conception is confined to Tawney’s early work, and he 
adopts a humanist conception, which acknowledges the legitimacy of a secular appropriation, in his 
masterpiece, Equality 32. In the diaries (1912-14), Tawney states that the concept of equal worth is a 
deeply and irrevocably Christian concept:  
 
In order to belief in human equality it is necessary to believe in God. It is only when one contemplates 
the infinitely great that human differences appear so infinitely small as to be negligeable [sic]…What is 
wrong with the modern world is that having ceased to believe in the greatness of God, and therefore the 
infinite smallness (or greatness – the same thing!) of man, it has to invent or emphasize distinctions 
between men. 33 
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Indeed, Tawney asserts in the diaries that without its derivation from a notion of God, the concept of 
equal worth has no foundation: 
 
The essence of all morality is this: to believe that every human being is of infinite importance, and 
therefore that no consideration of expediency can justify the oppression of one by another. But to believe 
this it is necessary to believe in God. To estimate men simply by their place in a social order is to 
sanction the sacrifice of man to that order. It is only when we realise that each individual soul is related 
to a power above other men, that we are able to regard each as an end in itself. 34 
 
Here Tawney is not merely presenting the Christian concept of equal worth as one theory amongst 
many, but as the only sound basis for equality. In the diaries, Tawney is positing an absolute conceptual 
dependence between equality and an acceptance of the existence of God. A secular advocacy of equal 
worth is thus fatally flawed: secular egalitarians who attempt to give a grounding to their theory or to 
define a strategy for equality are hampered by the fundamental philosophical failing that they cannot 
assert the equal worth of all humans because they are incapable of acknowledging humans’ shared 
inferiority in relation to the Almighty. But this is not the position that Tawney later adopts in Equality.  
 
In Equality, Tawney’s discussion of equality 35 is framed in terms of (inclusive) humanism, not 
(exclusive) Christianity 36:  
 
humanism is not the exclusive possession either of those who reject some particular body of religious 
doctrine or of those who accept it. It is, or it can be, the possession of both… Humanism is the antithesis, 
not of theism or of Christianity – for how can the humanist spirit be one of indifference to the issues that 
have been, for two thousand years, the principal concern and inspiration of a considerable part of 
humanity? – but of mechanism. 37  
 
The concept of equality based on humanism emphasises, not the smallness of all human beings in 
relation to the greatness of God, but the unifying principle of their common humanity and the 
aspiration of every human being towards perfection: 
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Its essence is simple. It is…to be regarded as a means to an end, and this end is the growth towards 
perfection of individual human beings…Its aim is to liberate and cultivate the powers which make for 
energy and refinement; and it is critical, therefore, of all forms of organisation which sacrifice 
spontaneity to mechanism. Resting, as it does, on the faith that the differences between men are less 
important and fundamental than their common humanity. 38  
 
So while Wright is correct to assert the importance of equal worth in the framing of Tawney’s key 
ideas, he fails to acknowledge the logical incompatibility between Tawney’s early formulation of equal 
worth outlined in the diaries, which is exclusionary, and his later formulation outlined in Equality, 
which is inclusionary. Wright’s suggestion that Tawney tactically adopts a secular idiom to appeal to 
non-religious readers, is unconvincing. The change in Tawney’s thought is not merely tactical, but 
philosophical: an inclusive secular formulation of equality cannot but undermine an exclusive Christian 
core. Tawney is surrendering what he initially conceived as purely religious territory to what he would 
then have regarded as profane forces, and so the shift cannot be seen merely as part of a pragmatic 
exercise in persuasion, but as a fundamental change in the basis of his political thought.  
 
The political realm  
We can trace a similar development away from a Christian foundation to a secular foundation in 
Tawney’s concept of politics. Whilst essentialist commentators recognise that Tawney’s experience of 
the First World War introduced a greater practical dimension to his thought, they fail to acknowledge 
that his perception of the political realm radically altered, with major implications for his thought as a 
whole. In the diaries, Tawney is clear that politics is morally deficient:    
 
Modern politics are concerned with the manipulation of forces and interest. Modern society is sick 
through the absence of a moral ideal. To try to cure this by politics is like make [sic] surgical experiment 
on a man who is dying of starvation or who is poisoned by foul air. 39 
 
According to Tawney’s diaries, politics is categorically incapable of stimulating ethical renewal. The 
false philosophy that characterises Britain has infested politics so that it is confined to the function of 
managing interests and economic affairs, rather than cultivating the moral principles necessary for an 
ethical renaissance. The grubby business of reconciling divergent interests, building alliances and 
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forging compromises is symptomatic of, rather than a cure for, the moral malaise that scars 
contemporary society. Tawney appears to believe that fundamental principles can be extracted from the 
political realm in order to achieve an overriding consensus founded on Christian norms: 
 
It ought to be possible to place certain principles of social and economic conduct outside the sphere of 
party politics, as matters agreed upon by the conscience of the nation. 40   
 
The conscience of the nation is not merely a humanitarian disposition, but an attitude founded on 
religiosity. Authentic ethical knowledge is the “common property of Christian nations”, whose validity 
rests on the fact that when its central precepts are enunciated, no-one would deny their veracity, nor 
approve of the dire social consequences that follow from failure to comply with their commands 41. 
Tawney thus imbues Christian ethics with an elevated status, insisting that right conduct is dependent 
on a “transcendental, religious, or mystical” standard 42. It is this divine derivation that allows 
fundamental issues to be extracted from the political firmament and to serve as the subject of a 
Christian consensus founded on an objective morality embodied by a Church that, unlike that state, 
refuses “the temporalities for the sake of spiritualities” 43. So, Tawney’ dismissal of politics is an 
articulation of the same Christian exclusivity that characterises his concept of equal worth.  
 
It is against this background that Tawney’s gradual acceptance of the efficacy of the political realm 
needs to be considered. In The Conditions of Economic Liberty (1918) 44, Tawney breaches the notion 
that politics is intrinsically bound to the morally bankrupt system it helps to administer and, therefore, 
wholly incapable of extricating itself to forge a new ethical existence. His position now is that the state 
can enter the ethical realm to encourage forms of behaviour which are morally legitimate 45. Indeed, the 
state should actively encourage the formation of enterprises which embody the enlightened values of 
social service, and discourage those organisations that remain committed to exploitative modes of 
organisation. Although a residual reluctance remains in Tawney’s mind - he suggests that the state can 
play a role “if it pleases” 46 – so there is not an unconditional embrace of state intervention, 
nevertheless, he has moved significantly away from a position in which the state, enmeshed in a 
decadent structure of short-term expediency, is unable to assist with the development of edifying 
organisational ideals, to a position in which the state has the capacity to extract itself from the 
pervasive materialism and perform a role in the creation of an ethical community.  
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Three years later, in The Acquisitive Society (1921) 47, Tawney continues with this greater secular 
emphasis, in that the book, barring some sparse biblical allusions, reads for the first ten chapters as a 
predominantly secular work. However, in the final chapter, Tawney makes a dramatic reversion to the 
hyper-religiosity of the Commonplace Book.  
 
Such a political philosophy implies that society is not an economic mechanism, but a community of wills 
which are often discordant, but which are capable of being inspired by a devotion to common ends. It is, 
therefore, a religious one, and, if it is true, the proper bodies to propagate it are the Christian Churches. 48  
 
This statement represents a public embrace of the private thoughts contained in the diaries, with 
Christianity re-emerging to the fore. The reaffirmation of the Church as the vehicle of the ethical 
consensus, while not a complete reversion back to the absolute Christian exclusivity of the 
Commonplace Book, does, in the absence of any discussion of the role of political parties, accord huge 
significance to the Church as an agent for fundamental change. Indeed, here Tawney accords the 
church the main role in securing the essential moral consensus necessary for renewal and also suggests 
it has the capacity to convert the public to this cause. He is adamant that the purity of the religious 
doctrine is not to be blemished by diluting its precepts to appeal to the agnostic or atheist; indeed, it is 
precisely its doctrinaire rigidity that becomes a source of its strength:  
 
It will appeal to mankind, not because its standards are identical with those of the world, but because 
they are profoundly different. It will win its converts, not because it involves no change in their manner 
of life, but because it involves a change so complete as to be ineffaceable. It will expect its adherents to 
face economic ruin for the sake of their principles. 49 
 
The addition of this profoundly religious finale to The Acquisitive Society, viewed in contrast to the 
largely secular argumentation that precedes it, gives the impression of a thinker in flux, employing non-
religious political language, yet still adhering to a fervent religiosity. However, subsequent works 
display an increasing sympathy with politics and political institutions. For example, Tawney states in 
The British Labour Movement (1925) 50 that the cause of reform necessitates action by political parties: 
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As one who has become concerned in labour politics merely for the practical reason that, rightly or 
wrongly, the particular reforms which appeal to me appeared, without the rise of a Labour Party to the 
control of public affairs, to have little chance of being realised with reasonable rapidity. 51 
 
This admission in The British Labour Movement that the Labour Party is necessary to bring about 
fundamental reform, dilutes the primacy of the Church. Indeed, the whole tenor of the work, covering 
such areas as education, the economy and international relations, stresses the centrality of the Labour 
Party. Tawney is accepting that a party political organisation, with an ideology primarily forged in a 
political environment that he previously accused of tainting all within its confines, not only has the 
capacity, but is actually central to ethical regeneration; the Church is not now seen as a sufficient 
author of moral reformation. 
 
The resounding abstractions which are the conventional and somewhat attenuated currency of political 
controversy – democracy, liberty, property, justice, equality of opportunity, freedom of enterprise and 
the rest – however much we may like to regard them as the embodiment of eternal verities, are not like 
Platonic ideas laid up in heaven, but take their colour and connotations from the dominant interests and 
practical needs of the different classes which from time to time set the tone of society, and are 
reinterpreted when, with political and economic changes, those dominant interests undergo a 
modification. 52 
 
The coming struggle will be fought on political terrain, with grand political concepts exemplifying 
class interests and the demands of political democracy, rather than fundamental abstract truths. The 
notion of a religious essentialism or an infallible harbour where ideological concepts can be safely 
anchored is not plausible in a fluid social and political context. This acceptance that core political 
concepts are not ‘transcendent’, is reinforced in The Choice before the Labour Party (1934) 53, when 
Tawney defines a political ideology: 
 
A political creed, it need hardly be said, is neither a system of transcendental doctrine, nor a code of 
rigid formulae. It is a common conception of the ends of political action, and of the means of achieving 
them, based on a common view of the life proper to human beings and the steps required at any moment 
more nearly to attain it. 54 
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The reference here to the common ends of political action founded on a view of a life appropriate to 
mankind, articulates the generalised humanism posited in Equality that all humans are of equal worth 
and are entitled to have their basic needs met to ensure individual development, and that all can 
contribute to the common culture. The fact that Tawney’s general definition of a political creed touches 
on his key concerns, means that he did not perceive its lack of a transcendental basis to be an 
impediment, or a justification for portraying political ideologies as inferior to religious doctrines. On 
the contrary, his acceptance that political doctrines are capable of not merely identifying the elevated 
ends that a society should aspire to, but also of prescribing the means of achieving them, reaffirms his 
abandonment of Christian exclusivity. By asserting that political ideologies, particularly socialism, can 
make meaningful moral appeals, and by accepting the indispensable role of political institutions, 
Tawney has breached the constricted Christian boundaries of the diaries. The early Tawney was in 
search of an Archimedean point outside the polluted political realm, where generalised Christian 
principles could be a basis for consensus, but the later Tawney accepts that moral and social change 
largely stems from the crucible of political activity.  
 
Refutation of the third fallacy 
 
In refuting the third fallacy perpetrated by the essentialist commentators – that the diaries unlock the 
secret that holds together Tawney’s political thought by setting the seal on its domination by Christian 
values – we make use of the Skinnerian argument that such an interpretation ignores the author’s own 
intentions at its peril. The private nature of the diaries weakens, rather than strengthens their 
interpretive value. At first sight, it may seem convincing to argue that private diaries are likely to reveal 
the authentic views of a writer. In writing a private document which he did not intend to publish, it 
could be argued that Tawney has no reason to engage in any sort of deception or invent some tactical 
ploy to disguise the fundamental basis of his thought. He can be utterly transparent in expressing his 
views, secure in the knowledge that he has only to account to himself. On this argument, it seems 
persuasive to assert that the religious-inspired musings of the diaries represent the real, uninhibited 
Tawney, and that they form the unacknowledged core of his subsequent work. However, there is a flaw 
in this argument: there is no evidence to suggest that Tawney wanted the diaries published, and we can 
reasonably infer that this was because they did not represent his considered ideas but only inchoate 
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thoughts. In common with most political theorists, Tawney meticulously polished his published work 
to ensure that it was worthy of presentation in the public domain, as Wright acknowledges: “Tawney’s 
work, even quite minor pieces, usually went through several versions before it saw the light of day” 55. 
The notion that their thoughts will be read, scrutinised and criticised imposes a discipline on authors to 
operate at their most reflective level. Tawney’s diaries did not require the rigour that goes with creating 
a work for public and peer consumption: as he was operating independently of an academic or 
politically engaged audience, the external discipline to advance arguments which are fully developed is 
absent. Since he is not involved in a sustained intellectual engagement, or contributing to a work on 
which his reputation will rest, we should be cautious about over-inflating the significance of The 
Commonplace Book or assuming that their private nature implies greater authenticity, revealing the 
“real” Tawney, which we can use to interpret the sanctioned works.  
 
Moreover, as we have seen, the diaries are governed by a Christian exclusivity in which key concepts 
are not merely influenced by, but dependent on, Christianity, whereas in the later works, Tawney 
justifies concepts on largely secular grounds. The fact is that the diaries represent Tawney’s thought 
only in the period 1912 – 14, and to expand their remit beyond their period of composition not only 
entails ignoring his own intentions, but also ignoring the profound way in which his subsequent 
thinking moves away from Christian exclusivity towards greater secular inclusivity. It is a central 
contention of this article that the mistaken assumption of continuity between the diaries and Tawney’s 
later works leads to a distorted analysis, imbuing the Commonplace Book with a maturity and 
significance it does not possess.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This analysis has demonstrated that essentialist interpretations of Tawney’s political thought are 
mistaken in their assertions of its consistency; its dependence on Christianity; and its derivation in his 
early diaries. Whilst Tawney’s canon of work concentrated on a number of enduring themes, his 
treatment of them varied over time, most evident in his abandonment of the Christian exclusivity that 
characterises the Commonplace Book. Simplistic assertions of consistency, dependence, and derivation 
fail to capture the complex and varied nature of the relationship between Tawney’s thought and his 
 16
Christianity. The only satisfactory way of analysing Tawney’s political thought is to track his 
intellectual trajectory, clarifying the changes that occurred in a long career. Only by a chronological 
approach that brings into sharp focus the different phrases of Tawney’s thought, can we aspire to an 
authentic interpretation of his intellectual contribution. 56 
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